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THE MULTIPLE IDENTITIES OF AZERBAIJAN
Dr Alireza Asgharzadeh
Abstract This paper focuses on the emerging Azerbaijani identity and its competing articulations in the Republic of Azerbaijan, in Iran, and in Diaspora. The northern Republic of Azerbaijan has a population of over 8 million people, the majority of whom have different social and political experiences than over 30 million Azeris in the South, or in Iranian Azerbaijan. However, there are formidable historical, socio-cultural, ethnic, and linguistic ties that bind all Azerbaijanis together as one people. This necessity of coming together finds its highest expression in Diaspora and among the Azeri émigrés. In the process, the Azeri Diaspora experiences a host of problems and challenges emerging from multiple identities, globalizing environments, and intercultural communications. This paper examines the multiple identities of Azerbaijan as complex sites of struggle, inclusion and exclusion. As such, the paper argues for an understanding of a common democratic identity that would be simultaneously applicable in the Republic of Azerbaijan, in Iranian Azerbaijan as well as in Diaspora.
Introduction In contemporary scholarly literature on Azerbaijan, the terms Azeri and Azerbaijani are used interchangeably and are understood to represent the majority Turkic-speaking population living in the northern Republic of Azerbaijan, in southern Azerbaijan and Iran, as well as in (Azeri) Diaspora. Further, these terms also represent the non-Turkic citizens of the Republic of Azerbaijan as well as the non-Turkic residents of southern Azerbaijan who may choose to identify themselves as Azeris or Azerbaijanis. Throughout this paper I use ‘Azeri’ and ‘Azerbaijani’ as the two common categories to refer to this complex population. In her valuable book titled Borders and Brethren: Iran and the Challenge of Azerbaijani Identity, Brenda Shaffer astutely observes that
Until the early 1990s, most Azerbaijanis in Iran referred to themselves as Turks. Some researchers and Azerbaijanis themselves refer to this group as the Azerbaijani Turks… I have used the term most commonly employed by the Azerbaijanis today, and which is considered most neutral. This is “Azerbaijani.”1
Since Shaffer’s observation a few years back, the debate around finding a uniform ethnic/linguistic/national identity for the people of Azerbaijan has intensified. Based on their lived experience and spatio-temporal contexts, the Azerbaijanis are now using identity categories as diverse as Azeri, Azeri-Turk, Turk, Iranian-Turk, Azerbaijani-Turk, South-Azerbaijani-Turk, and North-Azerbaijani-Turk to identify themselves. This rich choice of categories may in itself be an indication of how confusing the situation has become. While the existence of fragmented and multiple identity categories are normal manifestations of living in postmodern/postcolonial globalizing environments, the necessity of using a more comprehensive and inclusive designation is becoming pressingly evident. However, notwithstanding the increasing debate over a common designation, consensus is nowhere within sight regarding a uniform Azeri identity.
In its current stage, the ongoing debate over the ‘correct’ identity category for the Azerbaijanis evokes an image similar to that of Rumi’s2 'the Elephant in the Dark' parable, where a group of people tried to identify an elephant in a dark room by placing their hands on different parts of its body. Unable to see the animal in its entirety, they each described it based on where they touched it. For instance, a person whose hand landed on the trunk, called it a ‘drain pipe;’ while another, whose hand reached the elephant’s ear, called it a ‘kind of fan;’ and someone else who placed his hand upon its back called it a throne, and so forth.
Similar to the case of the people describing the elephant in the dark, the Azerbaijanis identify themselves based on their lived experience within specific environments, without being able to connect these various contexts under a more comprehensive general term. These kinds of multiple, uncertain and disrupted processes and categories of identification are quite normal in light of contemporary understanding of identity offered through postmodern and postcolonial discourses. It, however, becomes problematic when some Azerbaijanis adopt an essentialist notion of identity and try to compel others to follow this essentialist version.
This paper argues that despite the existence of ruptures and fragmentations, the choice of an inclusive democratic identity category is not only possible but extremely necessary in providing a common zone of struggle based on self-identification. In contrast to an essentialist understanding of identity, the paper forwards a postcolonial and postmodern understanding of identity as an effective means through which reaching a democratic and inclusive designation can be made possible. The democratic nature of such a common designation should be understood through its distance from racist and chauvinistic categories; whereas its inclusivity should be illustrated through its capacity in simultaneously defining the Azeris in Iran, in the Republic of Azerbaijan, and in Diaspora. The paper seeks to demonstrate that a postcolonial/postmodern vision of identity would be effective in an Azerbaijani context in that such a vision:
Defines identity in terms of its non-fixity, fluidity, and flexibility. This means that it is perfectly alright if some Azeris living in Iran refer to themselves as ‘Turks,’ ‘Iranian-Turks,’ or ‘Azerbaijani-Turks.’ Likewise, it should be understood as normal for other Azeris living in the Republic of Azerbaijan or in Diaspora to identify themselves as ‘Azeris’ and/or ‘Azerbaijanis.’ An understanding of this phenomenon will reduce the resorting to symbolic violence of those whose essentialist understanding of identity compels them to accuse others of being ‘traitor’ or ‘sellout’ due to their choosing of a different identity category. Such accusations are becoming quite common as identity based struggles gain increasing momentum in contemporary Iran.
Defines identity and its contexts in terms of their multiple and shifting natures. This definition allows for various parties to come together and negotiate the possibility of choosing a common democratic and inclusive identity, while allowing for the usage of diverse categories in different contexts. This way, the choice of a uniform identity category is determined in terms of such category’s usefulness and effectiveness, rather than its real or perceived racial/ethnic rootedness.
Provides the opportunity to widen our vision from a limited local context by linking the local to broader global contexts. In our increasingly globalizing environments, it is only through an understanding of various global and local perspectives that one can have a more sensible understanding of one’s own environment and the ways of transforming it. As such, the locally constructed identity categories such as ‘Turk,’ ‘Iranian-Turk’ and so on will need to be examined in terms of their usefulness in both global and local contexts.
Azerbaijan: An Historical Overview Azerbaijan literally means "the Land of the Keepers of Fire" and is the historical name of the region where Azeris live. As a geographic region it extends from northwestern Iran to Caspian Sea to the east, Kurdistan, Armenia and Turkey to the west, Georgia and Russia to the north. This strategic positioning reveals Azerbaijan’s geopolitical significance as a gateway to Russia and Turkey, and through them to the West. At the present time Azerbaijan is geopolitically divided into two parts: The northern Azerbaijan which became an independent country after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the southern Azerbaijan-which is currently a part of Iran. Apart from the Azeri-Turks who constitute over 80 percent of the inhabitants of Azerbaijan on both sides of the Araz River, there are other ethnic and religious minorities such as the Kurds, Armenians, Lezgis, Taleshis, Jews, Christians, and Bahai’s living in Azerbaijan.
The language of the majority of Azerbaijanis is 'Azeri' (variously known as Azeri-Turkic, Turki, Azerbaijani) and the religion of the majority of them is Shia Islam. There are over 50,000,000 Azeris living in today's world, of which 32,000,000 are believed to be living in southern Azerbaijan and Iran, around 8,000,000 in the Republic of Azerbaijan, close to 2,000,000 in Turkey, about 2,000,000 in Russia, and the rest are living in such countries as Georgia, Iraq, Ukraine and so on. In The Ancient History of Iranian Turks, Professor M.T. Zehtabi has traced the origination of current Azeris to ancient Sumerian and Ilamite civilizations, dating back to 6000 BC. Through the examination of archeological and linguistic evidences, Zehtabi has shown that today’s Azeris are remnants of such racial/ethnic components as the ancient Ilametes, the Medes, and other agglutinative language peoples like Kassies, Gutties, Lullubies and Hurraies.3
According to other sources, three different ethnic components have participated in the formation and the evolution of Azeri people: first, the Medes who were mainly concentrated in southern Azerbaijan; second, the Aran-Albanese who were living in the north; third, the Turks who have been living in various parts of Azerbaijan from the time immemorial.4 In the year 600 BC, Azerbaijan was conquered by the Persian emperor, Cyrus the Great. In 330 BC, Alexander the Great defeated the Persians and reconquered Azerbaijan. And three centuries later it was occupied by the Roman Empire. Later on, Azerbaijan continued to be ruled by the Roman Empire, the Persian Empire, and the Confederation of Caucasian Turks.5 Within the space of ten years from the death of Prophet Mohammed in 632 AD, around thirty-thousand Muslim Arabs attacked and Conquered Iran through the three famous battles of Qadisiyya and Jalula in 637 AD, followed by Nahavand in 641 AD, overthrowing the decaying Sasanid Empire. After the demise of Sasanians, segments of Azerbaijan became a part of the newly founded Muslim empire. Resistance against Arab invasion in northern and central Azerbaijan continued well through the 9th century.
In the year 837, the Arabs conquered the Castle of Babak-a stronghold for a powerful resistance movement in central Azerbaijan- crushed Babak's resistance movement, and established their dominion all over Azerbaijan.6 The presence of Arabs in Azerbaijan and Iran culminated in the Islamization of the region. After the Arab invasion, towards the end of the 7th century, a local dynasty known as Shirvanshahs ruled the northern Azerbaijan from 668 through 1539, when they were incorporated into the Safavid Empire, once more becoming unified with the south.7 Being an indigenous Azeri dynasty, the Safavids easily succeeded in integrating Shirvanshahs and their territory into the Safavid Empire. Through this reunification, Azerbaijan once again continued to enjoy its economic, cultural, and linguistic autonomy as an integrated whole well up to the early 19th century.
After suffering various intrusions throughout its history, in the 19th century Azerbaijan was twice invaded by Russia. As a result, the vast territory of northern Azerbaijan, or what is now the independent Republic of Azerbaijan, was annexed to the Russian Empire in 1828. The annexation of northern Azerbaijan by Russia notwithstanding, the southern region of Azerbaijan still continued to enjoy a relatively autonomous status, particularly in the areas concerning trade and commerce as well as culture and language. However, with the climbing on power in 1921 of Reza Khan and the subsequent establishment of the absolute monarchism of Pahlavi dynasty in Iran, South Azerbaijan’s regional, economic, linguistic and cultural autonomy came to an end, and through Reza Khan's harsh centralization policy, the hitherto independent region of Azerbaijan now became divided into a number of dependent "Ostans" or provinces.8
The Pahlavi dynasty ruled in Iran well over a half century and throughout this period a policy of forced assimilation aiming at the artificial creation of a homogeneous Farsi-speaking nation was rigorously implemented. As a consequence, the publication of newspapers, magazines and books in Azeri language became prohibited and the people of Azerbaijan were denied the right to education in their own language.9 In 1979, the Pahlavi regime was overthrown and, subsequently, the Islamic Republic was formed. With the fall of the Shah, his sponsored Persian nationalistic ideology was briefly overshadowed by an emerging ‘anti-nationalist' Islamic ideology. In the revolutionary atmosphere of the time, various ethnic demands and movements began to emerge particularly in Kurdistan, Khuzistan, Azerbaijan and Baluchistan. Upon consolidating its power bases, the new regime brutally suppressed the legitimate demands of various nationalities for cultural and linguistic rights. Identifying the Persian language as ‘the second language of Islam,’ the new regime vigorously continued to enforce the ban imposed on non-Persian languages during the Pahlavi era, notwithstanding that its own constitution had allowed for the teaching and learning of non-Farsi languages in the country.
In August 1991, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the formation of an independent Azerbaijani nation-state was declared north of the Iranian borders. With the coming of independence, the northern Azerbaijan once again continued to embrace the spirit of independence and autonomous nationhood as it had during the short-lived 1918-1920 period. Realizing the importance of such an event to the southern Azeris, the Iranian regime pursued a hostile relationship with the Republic of Azerbaijan, seeking to undermine its credibility, image, and achievements in every opportunity it got, particularly through the state-run media outlets both inside Iran and abroad.10 This animosity towards the Republic of Azerbaijan and its corresponding cultural, political, and linguistic policies vis-à-vis the Azeris inside Iran invoked various reactions on the part of Azerbaijanis. In turn, these reactions came to find their expression in the ongoing processes leading to identity formation among various segments of Iran’s Azeri population.
Language, Literature, and Identity 11 In current Iran, aside from three Azeri provinces of Ardabil, Eastern and Western Azerbaijan, the Azeri-Turkic is spoken in provinces and regions of Zanjan, Hamadan, Arak, Saveh, and northern Khorasan. Azeri-Turkic is also spoken by the Qashqayi Turks as well as various other Turkic-speaking peoples concentrated in the province of Fars and in central Iran. In addition to northern Republic of Azerbaijan, Azeri is also the indigenous language of Turkic peoples in Iraq as well as in Eastern Anatolia.12 The origination of an earlier written Azeri literature can be safely traced back to the famous epic of Dede Qorqut Kitabi (the Book of Dede Qorqud), the narratives of which were orally materialized in pre-Islamic Caucasia and were written down around the 6th and 7th centuries. The book is an invaluable collection of epos and stories, bearing witness to the language, the way of life, religions, traditions and social norms of peoples inhabiting large portions of Central Asia, parts of Caucasia and the Middle East centuries before the emergence of Islam. This is how the book introduces itself and its main character:
We begin with the name of the Creator and implore his help. Years before the time of the Prophet [Mohammed], there appeared in the Bayat tribe a man by the name of Qorqud Ata. He was the wise man of the Oghuz people. He used to prophecy and bring reports from the unknown world beyond, having been divinely inspired…13
In the course of the past two centuries, the book has been translated into many languages. In 1815, the German scholar H.F. Von Diez, produced a German translation of the book based on a manuscript found in the Royal Library of Dresden. In 1950, another manuscript was discovered by the Italian scholar Ettore Rossi in the Vatican library. Following the German rendition, Turkish renditions were published by Kilishli Rifat and Orhan Saik Gokyay in Istanbul in 1916 and 1938 respectively.14 Professor Hamid Arasli, a well-known Azeri scholar, published the first full text of the collection in Baku in 1939, reprinted in 1962 and again in 1977. Following Arasli’s rendition, the famous south Azerbaijani poet, Bulut Qarachorlu, in collaboration with Professor Mohammad Ali Farzaneh, provided a unique rendition of the book in two volumes in Arabic alphabet for Southern Azerbaijani readers. The first volume, titled Sazimin Sozu (the Tales of My Lute) was clandestinely published in Iran in 1960s with no publication date on it. The second volume titled Dedemin Sozu (the Tales of my Father) has not been published so far, although has been widely discussed through various sources.15
Aside from Dede Qorqut Kitabi, there are other common Turkic works such as Diwan Lughat at-Turk, written by Mahmud of Kashghar in 1072-73, and Qutadghu Bilig, written by Yusuf Khas Hajeb in 1077, that bear witness to the early literary formations in Azerbaijani language. Around 11th and 12th centuries, the Azeri language and literature flourished under the rule of Shirvanshahs. Among the leading representatives of Azeri literature in this period were such prominent figures as Qetran of Tabriz, Mekhseti Khanum, Khaqani of Shirvan, and Nizami of Ganja. Nizami's well-known Quintuple, Seven Beauties, Khosrow va Shirin, Iskandar-Nameh, Tohfatul Iraqein (Gifts from Iraq), and other works are among the Islamic world's classical literary heritage. Although Nizami did not produce his work in Azeri language, his narratives are, nonetheless, rooted in Azeri culture and tradition.
The 13th and 14th century Azerbaijan witnessed the birth of Hasan-Oglu's famous Ghazals, Qazi Darir's Yusuf va Zuleykha, Qazi Burhan ad-Din's Divan, and Imad ad-Din Nasimi's Quatrains. An outstanding Hurufi philosopher, mystic, and poet, Nasimi left an inerasable mark on Azeri philosophy, literature and culture.16 From a linguistic and literary viewpoint, Nasimi's language is of outstanding poetic quality. His poetry's artistry, depth, and veracity have gained Nasimi a lasting place among the pioneering literary figures in the Islamic world. Having perfectly mastered the three languages of Turkish, Persian and Arabic, Nasimi has prolifically written in each of these languages (although the survival of his Arabic works are in question). In essence, Nasimi's language marks the emergence of a distinct language and literature unique to Azerbaijan. In the words of M.F. Koprulu, “although Nasimi was not unfamiliar with the dialect of Anatolia, he used that of the Azeri Turkic more often."17
Koprulu's observation has been confirmed by M. Ergin, who makes similar remarks regarding the language of Qazi Burhan ad-Din, a contemporary of Nasimi and another forerunner in the 14th century Azeri literary scene. “Qazi Burhan ad-Din's language," writes Ergin,
does differ from the Anatolian texts and bears certain of the distinguishing features of Azeri-Turkic, which gave promise of its becoming a separate language. In view of this, it is not far of the mark to consider it the product of the period when the Azeri Turkic dialect was heading straight towards separation.18
Devoting his entire life to the struggle for freedom of expression, through his poetry Nasimi boldly attacked rigid regulations and religious bigotry. As a consequence, he was skinned alive in broad daylight at the Bazaar in the town of Heleb (Aleppo). Irrespective of his tragic destiny, Nasimi’s poetic and literary legacy for millions of Azerbaijanis continued to manifest the evolution as well as the consciousness of Azeri as an autonomous language and Azerbaijan as the national homeland.
The Azeri language and literature continued to develop and evolve during the 15th century when the Houses of Qara Qoyunlu and Agh Qoyunlu ruled in southern Azerbaijan and Iran. To this period belong such literary figures as Jahanshah Qaraqoyunlu (Haqiqi), Habibi and Sheyx Qasim Enver, among many others. The 16th century saw the establishment of the Safavid rule in Iran. The founder of this new dynasty, Shah Ismail, was a great lover of poetry and literature. Azeri was the main language in his court, followed by Farsi and Arabic, respectively. Under the pen name Khatayi, Shah Ismail produced his famous Divani Xetayi in Azeri-Turkic. Moreover, a unique literary style known as “Qoshma” was also introduced in this period, utilized and developed by Shah Ismail and later on by his successor Shah Tahmasp.19
Paralleling the Azeri written literature, various forms of profoundly rich folk and oral literature were also developing in this period. Included in Azeri folk literature were numerous forms of tales, proverbs and sayings peculiar to Azerbaijan such as Bayati, Sayaji, Duzgi and so on. In a sense, the 16th century was characterized by the rapid growth of Azerbaijan's folk literature. Such famous masterpieces as Kor-Ogli, Esli-Kerem, Shah Ismail, and Ashiq Qerib were created in this period. At the same time, the indigenous Azerbaijani minstrels, bards and Ashig poetry were also blossoming in this period.20
Perhaps it was no accident that Mohammed Fuzuli (1498-1556), the world renowned Azeri philosopher and poet emerged at this time. Masterfully building upon the legacy of his predecessors, Fuzuli became the unrivalled literary figure of his environment. His major works in Azeri language include The Divan of Ghazals, The Qasidas, and the poem Leyla ve Majnoon, among others. Fuzuli's poetry manifested the spirit of a profound humanism, reflecting the discontent of both the masses and the poet himself with totalitarianism, with feudal lords and establishment religion. From a linguistic perspective, his poetry marked a turning point in the development of Azeri language. In her pioneering work on Azeri literature, titled Azeri and Persian Literary Works in Twentieth Century Azerbaijan, Professor Sakina Berengian rightly identifies Fuzuli "as both the Ferdowsi and Hafez of Azeri literature."21 According to Professor Berengian, it was in Fuzuli's hands "that the Azeri language was brought to maturity and it was in his works that Azeri classical poetry attained its ultimate refinement."22
In the course of the 17th century, Fuzuli’s unique genre was taken up by such prominent poets and writers as Saeb and Qovsi of Tabriz, Shah Abbas Sani, Amani, Zafar, and many others. Thus, the uninterrupted and natural development of Azeri literature and language continued well into the 19th century, when the Qajars ruled Iran. The Nineteenth century Azerbaijan was characterized by separation in 1828 of northern segment of Azerbaijan and its annexation into the Russian Empire. According to a veteran Azeri scholar, Dr. Javad Heyat, separation of the northern Azerbaijan was not able to severe the ties between the Azeris. Far from it, this separation gave birth to a unique genre of literature and poetry “whose subject is the theme of separation between brothers.”23 In his famous poem, Hesret/Longing, Kamran Mehdi has captured the feelings of Azerbaijanis regarding this forced separation:
True, the Araz divides a nation But the earth underneath is one!24
The early 20th century marked the beginning of a new national and social consciousness in Azerbaijan. Influenced by various literary and socio-political trends in the wake of the Russian Revolution of 1905 and the Iranian Constitutional Revolution, the Azeri writers, intellectuals and poets began to revolutionize the Azerbaijani as well as the Iranian socio-cultural landscape. Fethali Akhundzadeh introduced drama into Iranian literature. Taliboff and Zeynal-Abedin of Maragheh laid the foundation of modern creative prose, social criticism and literary realism hitherto unknown in Iran. At the same time, Jelil Memet Quluzadeh and Aliakber Saber produced their leading social and political satires, widely spread through the now internationally renowned paper, Molla Nesred-Din.25
The northern Azerbaijan also produced such literary giants as Semed Vurghun, Suleyman Rustem, Resul Reza, Mir Jalal Memedxanli, and many others. In Tabriz, Mirza Hasan Rushdiyye laid the foundation of modern schooling and pedagogy. He wrote and used the first modern textbooks in the history of Iran, titled Veten Dili (the Language of Homeland) and Ana Dili (the Mother Tongue) in Azerbaijani schools, replacing the Quranic and traditional religious texts.26 Simultaneously, such poets and writers as A. Qarajadaghli, M. Hidaji, M. Xelxali, Nebati, Zikir and Shokuhi were promoting the ideals of social justice and democracy through their works.27 With the flourishing of all these literary and cultural production, it was not surprising that Azerbaijan became the center of Iran's Constitutional Revolution (1905-1911).
This rich literary legacy reached its climax in contemporary times in Mohammad-Hussein Shahryar’s ( 1905-1988 ) poetry, particularly in his masterpiece ‘Heyderbabaya Salam’ (Greetings to Heydar Baba).28 Commonly cherished by both the northern and southern Azerbaijanis, this work brings together various cultural and literary tendencies in a single genre, emphasizing once again a common origination of Azerbaijani language, literature, culture and identity for all Azeris. This kind of ‘common imagining’ in cultural/ethnic/linguistic realm provides a major building block for the construction of a unified and unifying identity.
The continuous development of this rich literary and cultural tradition, despite various ruptures and interruptions, is a strong indicator of a deep-rooted awareness on the part of Azerbaijanis regarding their language, nationality, culture, history and heritage. This clearly shows that Azeri was and has always been a powerful medium of literary, poetic and creative expression throughout Azerbaijan. From the beginning it was, and has always been, the national language of Azerbaijani Turks. This fact alone may explain the central significance of language in the formation, maintenance and endurance of Azerbaijani people’s national and cultural identity.
The Azeri Diaspora The Azeri Diaspora is a comparatively new phenomenon, rooted in a roughly three decades of history of migration. It owes its existence to two major events that took place in the recent history of the region: first, the 1978-79 Islamic Revolution in Iran; second, the demise of the Soviet Union and the establishment of the Republic of Azerbaijan in 1991. The Iranian revolution of 1978-79 was a major socio-political upheaval that affected all aspects of life in the country. In the periods during and after the Islamic Revolution, waves of mass migrations took place partly because of violations of human rights in Iran, partly as a result of the 8-year war with Iraq, and partly due to the worldwide impact of globalization along with a whole set of other economic and developmental factors.29 This migratory trend still continues, albeit on a much smaller scale.
According to the latest statistics, there are over five million Iranian immigrants in Europe and North America.30 And the current population of Iran totals to over seventy million. Given the fact that the Azeris comprise over thirty million of Iran’s total population, we can safely argue that about two million of the five million Iranian immigrants are Azeris. Thus, the main segment of an Azeri Diaspora, at least in terms of numbers and figures, come not from the north, but from Iran and the south Azerbaijan. In the case of the Azerbaijan Republic, the demise of the Soviet Union and the independence of northern Azerbaijan significantly contributed to the formation of an Azeri Diaspora. With the coming of independence, the iron curtain was lifted and the hitherto closed Azerbaijani society was exposed to the outside world in an unprecedented way. As a result, many Azeris were, for the first time, accorded the opportunity to travel, to migrate and settle down in a foreign country, for a variety of economic, educational, and sociopolitical reasons.
The coming of independence was also concomitant with the breakout of an ugly war between Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia over the Azeri enclave of Nagorno-Qarabagh. As always, millions of innocent civilians constituted the first casualties of the war. The Azerbaijani Republic produced over one million displaced persons. In effect, one out of every seven Azerbaijani citizen became a homeless refugee. Obviously, over and above all else, the refugees needed food on their plates, a roof over their heads and a place to rest. So they migrated-- at least the ones who could afford it. The demon of war brought with it a large scale destruction, followed by a grave sense of uncertainty, hopelessness and restlessness. As such, even many of those who were not directly affected by the war began to migrate. A new wave of Azeri (mass) migration took place during the first five years of the independence, to be followed by the future small scale migrations.
Added to this new wave of migration was the status of hundreds of thousands of those Azeris who, as citizens of the former Soviet Union, were living in such places as Russia, Georgia, Ukraine, and so forth. After the fall of the Soviet Union, these Azeris came to find themselves as immigrants living in an independent (alien) country--in someone else’s country, that is. So, they too became Azeri immigrants living in abroad. In essence, they are, and will continue to be, important components of the Azerbaijani Diaspora. And so will be the hundreds of thousands, by some estimates over two millions, of Azeris living in the Republic of Turkey.
The experience of diasporic life shows that in diaspora, the Iranian Azeris have come into close contact with the Azeris from the Republic of Azerbaijan. For instance, one could make mention of various Azerbaijani community centers, organizations, groups, media outlets, particularly journals, magazines, and internet discussion groups in which there are indications of close collaborations between the northern and southern Azeris. The increasing rate of intermarriages, the noticeably high rate of travels and visits from Diaspora to Baku, from Baku to Tabriz and vice versa could be cited as other indicators of tightening relationships between the two sides. Needless to say, all these developments have implications in terms of collective, national, and personal identification processes. In what follows, I will outline some of these implications and discuss how they influence the production and maintenance of a sense of unified Azerbaijani identity.
Identity Pathways The term identity acquires a complex character when applied to persons, groups, and communities. It can allude to someone’s individual identity in a personal sense, in the form of sexual/gendered identity for example; just as it may indicate a person’s ethnic, national, cultural, or religious identity in a collective sense. No matter how one may define it, the term ‘identity’ is generally used to mark the way individuals or groups define themselves within their environment at different periods of time in the context of their lived realities. For the most part, identities are context-bound, spatio-temporally defined personal or collective categories characterized by non-fixed, non-essential, shifting and changing attributes. The processes of identity formation are often intertwined in a complex web of personal, collective, national, regional and local identities and the intersections of these with such social markers as class, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, culture, religion, language, etc. Perhaps that is why it is not so easy to limit our choices to any exclusive designation when it comes to choosing an identity category. From a democratic viewpoint, it would make perfect sense if individuals were free to self-identify. However, while we all have strong tendencies towards self-definition and self-expression, we know very well that there are always powerful obstacles to the exercise of one’s freedom to self-identify. Sometimes these obstacles are socially, politically and culturally conditioned; and sometimes they are erected by powerful individuals and groups either from within or outside one’s community who assign themselves the right to designate the ‘correct and authentic’ identity for us.
In spite of all this, the multiple and shifting nature of identities are increasingly becoming manifest in contemporary environments. More and more we are realizing that our identities can no longer be limited to any single designation: man, woman, Muslim, Jew, Christian, etc. This fluid and shifting nature of identities are much more pronounced in diasporic communities where individuals assume multiple identities on a daily basis. For instance, a second generation individual of Mexican origin living in America has a variety of choices to identify herself: Mexican, Mexican American, Latina, Chicana, and so forth. Similar to the case of Hispanic populations in America, Azerbaijanis too have begun to realize the shifting nature of their multiple identities. In terms of their ethnic identity, historically they have been referred to as Azeris (ancient Assyrian and Arabic sources); Azeri-Turks (Turkish sources), and Turks (Persian sources). In time, some have stuck to Azeri, some to Azeri-Turk, and some to ‘Turk.’ In recent years, more designations have emerged due to the changing geopolitical situation in the region. As a result, more terms have been added to an already inflated pool of labels: Iranian-Turk, Azerbaijani-Turk, North-Azerbaijani-Turk, South-Azerbaijani-Turk, and Azerbaijani.
On the one hand, the existence of a variety of identity categories signals the signs and symptoms of living in a postcolonial and postmodern condition. On the other hand, it poses a major challenge to individuals of Azerbaijani heritage in articulating a common identity which could be concurrently applicable to the Azeri people on both sides of the Araz River as well as in Azeri Diaspora. Which term, which label, what designation is most capable of defining such an inclusive identity in a clearly unambiguous fashion, particularly within a constantly globalizing and changing world? Is it ‘Azeri/Azerbaijani’ or is it ‘Turk?’ Or is it other combinations? Can all of these be used as different manifestations of the same identity or is there a need to choose a single one? Evidently, the exercise of ‘free choice’ in using identity categories in the context of Azerbaijan has encountered various practical, cultural and linguistic difficulties which necessitate the significance of using a common identity category by all Azerbaijanis. In the following pages I will discuss various issues and problems associate with the use of a number of popular Azerbaijani identity categories and highlight the necessity of reaching a consensus around a common designation.
A Pan-Ethnic Identity: ‘We All Are Turks’ In its current usage, the term ‘Turk’ defines the ethnic/linguistic/national identity of the majority of people in the Republic of Turkey. It also defines the ethnic/cultural/linguistic identity of a variety of other groups and communities in such places as Central Asia, Caucasia, Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Balkans who loosely use the term to refer to their ethnic affiliations. One of the earliest sources that makes mention of the term ‘Turk’ is an encyclopedia titled Diwan-i Lughãt at-Turk, written by Mehmud of Kashger in 1072-73. In this book, the author traces the genealogy of the word ‘Turk’ back to the time of the Prophet Noah and claims ‘Turk’ to be the name of one of Prophet Noah’s sons.31 There are also references to ‘Turk’ and its variations such as ‘tu-kiu,’ ‘tur-kiut,’ ‘tur-kiu,’ ‘turku,’ ‘turukh,’ ‘durukh,’ and ‘turuk’ in some ancient Assyrian, Chinese and Japanese sources.32 These references indicate that some segments of the inhabitants of Azerbaijan, Central Asia, Caucasia and the Middle East were referred to as ‘Turks’ around 1500 BC.
More recently, there has been located in the People’s Republic of Mongolia archeological evidence known as the Orkhon Inscriptions that, according to Turkish sources, are the first written monuments in which the word ‘Turk’ is used. Carved from rocks and marbles, these inscriptions contain the first signals of Turkic culture and language and are considered to constitute the beginning of the Turkic family tree.33 Furthermore, the existence of considerable similarities between the ancient Sumerian language and current Turkic languages has led some scholars to consider the ancient Sumerian tongue as the proto-Turkic language of the ancient world.34
As far as the recent written history is concerned, various sources indicate that the majority of Azerbaijan’s inhabitants have consistently referred to themselves as Turks. Others have also identified them as ‘Turks.’ The term ‘Turk’ is thus both a self-designation as well as a designation assigned by others. During the Pahlavi rule in Iran, the term Turk, the Turks themselves, in fact everything Turkic was extremely demonized. Turks were associated with savagery, barbarism, bloodshed, pillage, stupidity, and backwardness.35 The Iranian Turks were constantly humiliated, mocked and laughed at all over the country. There were derogatory remarks, racial slurs and epithets about them on TV programs, radio broadcasts, in magazines, newspapers, works of literature, history, etc. After the demise of the Pahlavi regime, some Azeri scholars started on building and rebuilding their Turkic identity. Since then, the Turkic identity has been valorized by various intellectuals and nationalist groups alike. And this marks the beginning of the usage of ‘Turk’ as a local identity.
A Local Identity: ‘We Are Iranian Turks’ The designation ‘Iranian-Turk’ is constructed locally, in the context of Iran and the Persian racist discourse that seeks to otherize different ethnic groups such as the Arabs and Turks by assigning the ownership of the country to “Aryan races” alone.36 To the extent that the Turkic identity is demonized and dehumanized in Iran, the Iranian Turks build up this identity in an attempt to counter the racist attacks leveled against it. While various assimilatory methods such as the denial of Turkic identity and conformity to the dominant racist discourse were adopted on the part of some Azeri intellectuals during the Pahlavi regime, the current movement to reclaim Turkic identity is increasingly becoming popular in Azerbaijan and other parts of Iran. In effect, this act of reclamation uses what maybe called an essentialist understanding of identity to offset the racist attacks by the dominant exclusionary order. It may be considered essentialist because it is often reconstructed vis-à-vis the essentialist and racist construction of Persian/Aryan racial group, by way of which this group is presented as being in the possession of an unchanging, fixed, pure and authentic identity with biologically and culturally superior qualities.37 The use of ‘Turk’ as an anti-thesis to a racist Persian identity maybe regarded as what Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak has termed a ‘strategic essentialism.’38
An essentialist use of ‘Turk’ on a local Iranian level has inevitably linked this identity to the larger ideology of Turkism rooted in an existing notion of pan-ethnic/pan-Turkist identity. This linkage is demonstrated through reactions shown on the part of Iranian Turks to issues emerging from Armenian-Turkish and Kurdish-Turkish relations. Belonging to a pan-ethnic identity compels some Azerbaijanis to act as advocates of the former Ottoman Empire or the current Turkish Republic by showing reactions against the demands that certain ethnic groups such as the Armenians and the Kurds have from these political entities. As a result, some ethnic conflicts existing in the Turkish Republic are spelled over to Azerbaijan and are automatically made to be an Azerbaijani issue. Whereas in reality they are not Azerbaijani issues but issues related to the Turkish government.
Thus, this essentialist and undemocratic understanding of pan-ethnic identity serves to create hostilities among various ethnic groups particularly at a time when these groups need to be cooperating with one another towards the achievement of common social, cultural, political and collective rights. For instance, in an article titled “A Word with the People of South Azerbaijan,” Dr Alireza Nazmi-Afshar, a well-known Azerbaijani activist, warns the Azerbaijanis that the independence of South Azerbaijan from Iran will eventually lead to the independence of Kurds from Turkey, which in his view, would be disastrous to the Turks all over the world. As he puts it,
The Azerbaijanis’ demand for independence from Iran, no matter how reasonable and rightful, will legitimize similar demands on the part of PKK Kurds in Turkey and Dashnak Armenians in Qarabagh… Is this really what we want? By saying this perhaps I will be accused of Pan-Turkism. But if this kind of responsibility towards other Turks and their national interests…is Pan-Turkism…then I am a Pan-Turkist. I am a Pan-Turkist. I am a Pan-Turkist.39
In addition to creating animosity and hatred among various ethnic groups in Iran , this kind of pan-ethnic identity serves to project an undemocratic image of Azerbaijani people and their struggle for justice, equality and human rights. As such, more and more, a pan-ethnic vision of identity loses its significance particularly for those Azeris who advance their struggle within a framework of human rights, justice, and anti-racist struggle. ‘Turk’ is the proper name and national identity of the Turkic citizens of the Republic of Turkey. In order to distinguish themselves from the Turks of Turkey, some Azeris have sought to refer to themselves through designations such as Azerbaijani-Turk or Iranian Turk. These kinds of hyphenated-combinations are prone to criticism for being too long, too vague and confusing, awkward to pronounce and uneasy to write. The term may make sense in Azeri language and among Azeri audiences, but when translated into someone else’s language, others do not understand at all what the term stands for. This becomes completely problematic particularly in multicultural and multilingual diasporic environments. For instance, if we were to follow this line of reasoning in Diaspora, then an Azeri-Canadian such as myself would have to identify him or herself as ‘Azerbaijani-Turkish-Iranian-Canadian.’ That how awkward and confusing and impractical this sounds is self-explanatory!40 Hence, the necessity for a more familiar global identity, one which would be easily applicable to Azerbaijanis living in Diaspora, in Iran, and in the Republic of Azerbaijan.
The Azeri Alternative: A Transcultural/Diasporic Identity ‘Azeri’ is another important designation that is used as an identity category to represent the Azerbaijani people. We come across this term in early Assyrian and Arabic sources, spanning the history some three thousand years back. In ancient Assyrian sources, for instance, there is mention of a city and region known as ‘Azari’ situated in the vicinity of “the Lake of Urmu” in western Azerbaijan.41 The inhabitants of this city were referred to as the “Azers/Azerler” who were a member of the Turkic racial/ethnic group.42 The Assyrian sources document a directive issued by the Assyrian King, Sargon II, in the last quarter of the 8th century BC, regarding the reparation and renovation of a major highway that connected a number of important cities in Caucasia and the Middle East. The official in charge of implementing the King’s order writes:
I remove […] from Sare to Dur-Atanate, the Arraphaeans remove […] from Dur-Atanate to Dur-Taliti, [I] remove [the…] again from Dur-Taliti to Azari… [emphasis added]43
A number of Arab travellers and historians have also made frequent references to ‘Azerbaijan’ and ‘al-Azeriyya.’44 Yaqut al-Hamavi, the 13th century Arab traveller and historian, regarding the language of the inhabitants of Azerbaijan writes:
They have a peculiar language called al-Azerriya and no one can understand it except for themselves.45
Azerbaijan being the name of the land, the Arabs called the vast majority of its inhabitants and their language ‘al-Azerriya.’ This ‘al-Azeriyya’ was transliterated/translated into Persian and Turkish sources as ‘Azeri,’ which has been used alongside ‘Turk’ to refer to the identity of Azerbaijan’s inhabitants. In fact, the two terms have been used interchangeably not only by the Azerbaijanis themselves, but by the Arabs, Persians, and Europeans as well. For instance, regarding the definition of the term, we read in Borhan-e Qate’, the great Persian Encyclopedia:
When the Oghuz came to that region [i.e., Azerbaijan], the Lord of Oghuz took liking to one of its towns called Ujan. He asked each of his people to bring a skirt-full of earth and pour it there. He himself brought a skirt-full and poured. All his army personnel and his people each brought a skirt-full and piled there. Soon a gigantic mountain was formed. He named it Azerbaijan, for Azer in Turkic stands for height and ‘Baijan’ means the elders and lords.46
Azeri and Turk have been used interchangeably throughout most of Azerbaijan’s modern history. At least such was the case until an Iranian intellectual named Ahmad Kasravi published an article in the 1920s and refuted thereby the synonymity between the two terms. Himself of an Azerbaijani origin, Kasravi ventured on to claim that, among other things, Azerbaijan was originally populated by ‘Pahlavi/Farsi-Speaking’ Aryans who had later on become Turkified due to the Seljuq and Mongol invasions of Iran in the eleventh and thirteenth centuries, respectively. Hence: the ‘invention’ of an Indo-European Azari/Azeri language.
Immediately after the popularization of Kasravi’s theory, the terms ‘Azerbaijan’ and ‘Azeri’ became highly politicized. The dominant Persian group in Iran used the opportunity to advance its chauvinistic agenda of delegitimizing Iran's ‘non-Indo-European’ ethnic groups. Many linguists, historians, and social scientists joined in and tried to prove that the language spoken in Ancient Azerbaijan was exclusively and entirely Persian.47 A number of European social scientists and ‘Orientalists’ too supported these chauvinistic views, insisting that Farsi was ‘the only’ language spoken in all parts of the ‘Iranshehr’ prior to the emergence and triumph of Islam in Iran.48 Elsewhere49 I have dealt with Kasravi’s theory in some detail. It is crystal clear by now that his assumptions about the Azeri language lacked serious historical, linguistic or scientific credibility. He publicized such views because he believed they were going to be “good for Iran.”50 It was the era of European positivism and Aryanist racism, when monolingualism was promoted and diversity was discarded. Kasravi and his followers were proceeding based on the assumption that there was a ‘pure Aryan/Iranian’ race that could be identified and maintained in its ‘pure’ form. Language was the main signifier of this race’s identity and authenticity. In the context of Iran, this language could not be any other than Farsi/Persian. Therefore, the first step in purification of the supposedly Aryan race of Iran was to annihilate the variety of non-Aryan languages spoken in the country. Thus, by inventing an Aryan language for the Azeris and through forcing them to abandon their language for Farsi, Kasravi and his followers thought that they were purifying Iran’s Aryan race and culture.
Irrespective of these racist endeavors, the fact remains that ancient Azerbaijan was a fertile land on which multiplicity of races, languages and cultures flourished side by side. According to the tenth century Arab traveller, al-Muqaddasi, “over 70 languages were spoken in Azerbaijan.”51 Ibn Hawqal, another 10th century Arab historian determined the number of languages spoken in Azerbaijan and Caucasia to be “360 spoken languages.”52 It is not surprising then to see a certain Caucasian mountain is referred to in Arabic sources as “Jebal-ul-Alsana” or “the Mountain of Languages.”53
This rich variety clearly illustrates the existence of high degree of linguistic, ethnic and cultural diversity in ancient Azerbaijan. As such, it should not be difficult to dig out fragments of a variety of dead or living languages from that region. The problem arises, though, when certain groups and individuals try to present one single language as ‘the only authentic and original and pure language spoken in ancient Azerbaijan.’ This was the mission upon which Ahmad Kasravi and his followers had embarked. Obviously, this kind of misrepresentation entails an essentialist notion of identity, a notion which has already been rejected as being racist, assimilatory, and exclusionary. A definition of ‘Azeri’ that is currently used in international literature does not correspond to Kasravi’s race-based and race-driven definition. The meaning of Azeri, much like other linguistic products, has been influenced by natural shifts, ruptures and transformations in language. In its current form, it stands for the inhabitants of Azerbaijan and their language, which is a Turkic one. Azeri is widely used in intercultural communications mainly because of its simplicity, brevity and familiarity. It alludes to a distinct people living in or originating from a distinct land; and it does this in the most transparent fashion, a quality that its rival terms lack. It does not require hyphenation, prefix or suffix. Perhaps that is why, more and more Azerbaijanis are realizing that ‘Azeri’ is here to stay.
A Democratic Alternative: the Emerging Azerbaijani Identity Alongside the recognition of ‘Azeri’ as a viable ethnic and linguistic designation by the international community, the term ‘Azerbaijani’ is also making a comeback. In his recent visit to the US, the President Ilham Aliev of Azerbaijan announced on April 26, 2006:
Azerbaijanis live in many countries. Recently we had the Second Congress of World Azerbaijanis. And according to our estimations, there are more than 50 million Azerbaijanis who live around the world, and about 30 million of them live in Iran.54
Those following the development of identity formations among the Azeris can appreciate the significance of the term ‘Azerbaijani’ in President Aliev’s articulation. The choice of this term corresponds to the democratic, diverse and multicultural vision of Azerbaijan that the president skillfully projects of his country:
Azerbaijan is a multinational country… We have various nationalities, various religions represented, the highest degree of religious and ethnic tolerance. Azerbaijan is a secular country, and not only by its constitution, but by way of life.55
It is the ‘Azerbaijani-ness’ that binds the diverse cultural, ethnic, and religious communities together. And that is why the designation ‘Azerbaijani’ represents a democratic identity. It is not based on some essentialist, racist, or ethnocentric vision of solidarity in the context of ‘blood,’ race or ethnicity. It is based on common citizenship, land and territory, which makes it a democratic identity. This ‘Azerbaijani’ identity received a major boost recently, when various Azeri-Canadian individuals, groups and communities issued public statements demanding all Azeris residing in Canada to identify themselves on the 2006 Census Questionnaire as ‘Azerbaijanis’ or ‘Azeris’ rather than Turks, Iranians, Persians and other combinations.56 The question number 7 on the census questionnaire states: “What is the language that this person [you] first learned at home in childhood and still understands?57 “If we answer Turk or Turkish to this question,” one of the public statements observed,
we will be considered as nationals of the Republic of Turkey. And if we reply Persian or Farsi, we will be considered Iranian nationals. Obviously, both responses undermine our Azerbaijani identity and are, therefore, incorrect… Let us all come together and announce once for all through this census that: We are Azerbaijanis and our mother tongue is Azerbaijani. (emphasis in original)58
While these kinds of open acknowledgements of Azeri/Azerbaijani identity in the past would invoke harsh responses on the part of those adhering to an essentialist pan-ethnic identity, this time there was no harsh reaction or symbolic violence committed against those promoting the ‘Azerbaijani’ identity. This new awareness may in itself indicate the evolution of Azeri Diaspora from infancy towards maturity. In fact, there is a rich history behind this democratic ‘Azerbaijani’ identity in both southern and northern Azerbaijan(s). In the North, it was Mohammed Emin Resulzadeh who for the first time came up with the common Azerbaijani identity in the early 20th century. At the time, the Azerbaijanis together with other Turkic-speaking peoples of the Russian Empire were commonly identified as ‘Rusiyye Musulmanlari’ (the Muslims of Russia), ‘Tatarlar’ (the Tatars) or ‘Rusiyye Turkleri’ (the Turks of Russia), much the same way as some Azeris in the South currently refer to themselves as ‘the Iranian Turks’ or ‘the Turks of Iran.’ While observing the existence of certain similarities among various Turkic peoples in the region, Resulzadeh maintained that Azerbaijan constituted a distinct society due to unique historical, cultural, and social characteristics shared by its inhabitants.59 From this observation a modern notion of Azerbaijani identity was born.
Similarly, it was during the Democratic Government (1945-46) of Mir Jafar Pishevari that a sophisticated Azerbaijani identity was developed in southern Azerbaijan. In this period, notions such as Azerbaijani language, Azerbaijani nation, Azerbaijani national homeland became prevalent. It is noteworthy that, although previous movements such as the Constitutional Movement and the Movement of Sheyx Mohammed Xiyabani were strongly rooted in Azerbaijan and had some ethnic tendencies, these movements and their leadership were not politically sophisticated enough to see Azerbaijan as a distinct society and to view it as the national Azeri homeland. This changing and shifting nature of identity formations among the Azeris confirm the post-modern and post-colonial definition of identity in the sense that identities are not some sort of fixed and unchanging phenomena. On the contrary, they are quite fluid, hybrid, and flexible. Our world is full of “melange and hotchpotch,”60 “ambivalent”61 and “subaltern”62 identities, and we should not, in fact cannot, be essentialists or fundamentalists when it comes to our identification. As Edward Said puts it,
No one today is purely one thing. Labels like Indian, or woman, or Muslim, or American are not more than starting-points, which if followed into actual experience for only a moment are quickly left behind. Imperialism consolidated the mixture of cultures and identities on a global scale. But its worst and most paradoxical gift was to allow people to believe that they were only, exclusively, white, or black, or Western, or Oriental.63
As the Republic of Azerbaijan becomes more integrated into the world community, the prospect of accepting the Azerbaijani/Azeri designation becomes more practical in both southern and northern Azerbaijan. For all intents and purposes, the international community has already accepted ‘Azeri’ and/or ‘Azerbaijani’ as legitimate ethnic/linguistic/cultural/national identity of Azerbaijani people. Compared to their rival terms such as Turk, Azerbaijani-Turk, Iranian-Turk, the ‘Azeri’ and ‘Azerbaijani’ designations are more inclusive, more familiar and much more transparent. And this makes them suitable identity categories for the 21st century.
Conclusion Identities are articulated within a variety of shifting social, political, economic, cultural and discursive contexts. The constantly changing nature of identity contexts warrant renewed articulation and examination of identity categories. Essentialist understandings of identity are rooted in equally essentialist notions of race, ethnicity, language and culture. Such understandings can and often do have exclusionary consequences particularly in pluralistic environments. This accentuates the necessity of promoting more democratic and inclusive notions of identity in contemporary diverse societies. A non-essentialist and flexible approach to identity allows for democratic dialogue and negotiation which can result in a formulation of a locally effective and globally relevant identity category. This way, as citizens of a small global village, we may be moving towards the achieving of what Pico Iyer has called ‘a global soul.’64
This paper has looked into the multiple identities of Azerbaijan as these identities continue to oscillate among various geo-political and historical zones, conditioned by lived experiences of individuals, groups, and communities. The paper shows that such identity categories as ‘Turk,’ ‘Iranian-Turk,’ ‘Azeri,’ and ‘Azerbaijani’ are constructed based on different social, cultural, political, and economic conditions in Iran, in the Republic of Azerbaijan, and in the Azeri Diaspora. The paper discusses how an essentialist version of a ‘Turkic’ identity has been forming in Iran since the 1978-79 revolution, mainly in reaction to an equally essentialist and aggressively racist construction of Farsism and Aryanism. Simultaneously, it looks into a more flexible and inclusive ‘Azerbaijani’ identity that has been shaping in the Republic of Azerbaijan directly in response to issues emerging from an increasingly globalizing, diverse and heterogeneous nation-state.
The paper shows that as the Republic of Azerbaijan becomes socio-economically and geopolitically significant, and to the extent that it is acknowledged by the international community as such, its influence on Azeri Diaspora becomes much stronger than the influence received from Iran and the southern Azerbaijan. Given this constantly increasing influence, it is reasonable to conclude that the ‘Azerbaijani’ and ‘Azeri’ identity categories are on their way to becoming dominant designations in the Azeri Diaspora.
NOTES 1Brenda Shaffer, Borders and Brethren: Iran and the Challenge of Azerbaijani Identity (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002), xii. 2Jalal ad-Din Rumi, The Mathnawi-ye Ma'nawi, trans. J.W. Redhouse, (London: Trubner & Co. 1259/1881). 3M.T. Zehtabi, Iran Turklerinin Eski Tarixi. Ikinci chap (Tebriz: Artun, 1999). 4Rahim Rayees-Nia, Azerbaijan dar Seir-e Tarikh-e Iran, 2 vols. (Tabriz: Nima Publishers, 1990). 5Audrey L. Altestadt, The Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity under Russian Rule (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1992); R.G. Suny, ed., Transcaucasia: Nationalism and Social Change: Essays in the History of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia (Ann Arbor: Michigan Slavic Publications, 1983). 6Keith Hitichins, "The Caucasian Albanies and the Arab Caliphate in the Seventh and Eighth Centuries." in R. Savory, ed., Iran under the Safavids. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 4. 7 Vladimir Minorsky, A History of Sharwan and Darband in the 10th-11th Centuries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958). 8Richard W. Cottam, Nationalism in Iran (London: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979). 9Javad Heyat, “Regression of Azeri
Language and Literature under the Oppressive 10Shaffer, Borders and Brethren; Asgharzadeh, Iran and the Challenge of Diversity. 11This section on Azeri literature is a revised version of the same section that I have written in an article titled “The Rise and Fall of South Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (1945-46): A Look at Hegemony, Racism, and Center-Periphery Relations in Contemporary Iran,” (2000) published online at Virtual Azerbaijan website: http://72.14.203.104/search?q=cache:0LbLq479fEJ:www.zerbaijan.com/azeri/AlirezaAsgharzadeh.htm+alireza+asgharzadeh%2Bthe+rise+and+fall&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1 Some parts of this small section have also been used by Wikipedia, under the heading “Azerbaijani Literature”: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Azerbaijani_literature&diff=52451658&oldid=52451375 12Zehtabi, Iran Turklerinin Eski Tarixi; Heyat, “Regression of Azeri Language.” 13E.M. Demircizade, Kitab-i Dede Korkut Dastanlarinin Dili (Baku: 1959); Geoffrey Lewis, ed., The Book of Dede Korkut (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974). 14Demircizade, Kitab-i Dede Korkut; Lewis, The Book of Dede Korkut. 15Mohammedali Farzaneh, Dede Qorqud (Tehran: Entsharat-e Farzaneh, 1978). 16R.F.K. Burrill, The Quatrains of Nesimi: Fourteenth-Century Turkic Hurufi (The Hague: Mouton, 1972), 87.
17M.F. Koprulu, Azeri Edebiyati (Istambul, 1958), 118. 18Muharrem Ergin, Turk Dili ve Edebiyati Dergisi (November issue, 1950), 287. 19Javad Heyat, Azerbaycan edebiyyat tarixine bir baxish (Tehran: Sazman-e Chap-e Khajeh, 1990). 20Alireza Asgharzadeh, Notes on Azeri/Turk dichotomy. Ildirim 1(4), 2000, 16-21. 21Sakina Berengian, Azeri and Persian Literary Works in Twentieth Century Azerbaijan (New York: New York University Press, 1992), 19. 22ibid. 23Heyat, “Regression of Azeri Language,” 14. 24Kamran Mehdi, Edebiyyat ve Incesenet (Baku: ChicheklerYayini, 1980). 25Asgharzadeh, “Notes on Azeri/Turk dichotomy.” 26Berengian, Azeri and Persian Literary Works. 27Heyat, “Regression of Azeri Language”; Asgharzadeh, “Notes on Azeri/Turk dichotomy.” 28Mohammed Hossein Shahryar, Heydarbabaya Salam (Tabriz, 1957). 29Alireza Asgharzadeh, “Islamic fundamentalism, Globalization, and Migration: New Challenges for Canada,” in Rose Folson, ed., Calculated kindness: global restructuring, immigration and settlement in Canada (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 2004), 130-150. 30Asghar Fathi, ed., Iranian Refugees and Exiles Since Khomeini (California: Mazda Publishers, 1991); Asgharzadeh, “Islamic fundamentalism, Globalization, and Migration.” 31Mahmood Kashgari, Divan Lugat et-Turk, trans. M. Siyaqi, (Tehran: Pajuheshgah-e Olum-e Ensani ve Motaleat-e Farhangi, 1073/1996). 32A.N. Kononov, Opit analiza termina “Turk,” (SE, No 1, 1947); Zehtabi, Iran Turklerinin Eski Tarixi. 33Turkish Daily News, 17 April, 2001. 34Zehtabi, Iran Turklerinin Eski Tarixi; Alireza Asgharzadeh, "Current Azerbaijani Situation and the Problematic of Diaspora: Methods and Strategies for Building Alliances," Tribun, 2002, http://www.tribun.com/Aktuel/Akt103.htm 35Chafi Javadi, Tabriz ve Piramun, (Tehran: Nahsr-e Diba, 1971); Enayetullah Reza, Iran va Turkan dar Ruzgar-e Sasanian, (Tehran: Sherket-e Entsharat-e Elmi va Farhangi, 1986). 36Asgharzadeh, Iran and the Challenge of Diversity. 37Alireza Asgharzadeh, “The Anatomy of Iranian Racism: Reflections on the Root Causes of South Azerbaijan’s Resistance Movement,” Baku Today (May 28, 2006), http://www.bakutoday.net/view.php?d=21507 38Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" in C Nelson and L. Grossberg ,eds., Marxism and the interpretation of Culture, (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988). 39Alireza Nazmi-Afshar, “Sokhani ba mardom-e Azerbaijan Janubi,” Shams Tabriz (May 13, 2006)1, http://www.shamstabriz.com/nazmi-name.htm 40Asgharzadeh, “Notes on Azeri/Turk dichotomy;” "Current Azerbaijani Situation.” 41G.B. Lanfranchi and S. Parpola, eds.,
State Archives of Assyiría, vol v, the 42Firidun Agasioglu, Azer Xalqi (Baki:Chashioglu Neshriyyati, 2000), 16. 43State Archives of Assyria, vol.5, N229, r.1-9; Agasioglu, Azer Xalqi, 16-17. 44see for example S. Ibn Howqal, Surat al-Arz, ed., J. Shoar (Tehran: Bonyad-e Farhang- e Iran, 1966); Al-Mas’udi, Kitab
al-Tanbih val-Ishraf, ed., M.J. de Geoje (Leiden: Brill, 1894); S. Al-Muqaddasi,
Ahsan ut-Taqasim fi Ma’rifat ul-Aqalim, ed., M.J. de Geoje 45Hamavi, Kitab Mo’jam, 102. 46M. Khalaf-Tabrizi, Borhan-e Qate’, ed., M. Moin (Tehran: Ibn-e Sina, 1963/1983), vol 1, 24. 47Mahmood Afshar, ‘Aghaznameh’ Ayendeh, 1(1), (1925), 5-6. 48Joseph Marquaurt, Eransahr nach der Geographie des Ps. Moses Xorenac’i (Berlin: Weidmann, 1901); Gordon V. Childe, The Aryans: A Study of Indo-European Origins (London: Kegan Paul, 1926). 49Asgharzadeh, Iran and the Challenge of Diversity. 50Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-e Hejdah Saleh-ye Azerbaijan (Tehran: Taban, 1941); Ahmad Kasravi, Azeri ya Zaban-e Bastan-e Azerbaigan, (Tehran: Taban, 1938); Ahmad Kasravi, Shahryaran-e Gomnam, (Tehran, 1929); Yahya Zaka, Maqalat-e Kasravi, (Tehran: Nahsr-e Danesh, 1955). 51Al-Muqaddasi, Ahsan ut-Taqasim, 260. 52Ibn Howqal, Surat al-Arz, 82. 53Asgharzadeh, "Current Azerbaijani Situation” 54Ilham Aliev, “A Conversation with Ilham Aliyev,” (Federal News Service, April 26, 2006), http://www.cfr.org/publication/10547/conversation_with_ilham_aliyev_rush_transcript_federal_news_service_inc.html 55Ibid. 56Shams Tabriz News, “Hamvatanan-e Aziz-e Azerbaijani,” (May 9, 2006)1, http://www.shamstabriz.com/kanada-sarsomary.htm 57Statistics Canada, Census Questionnaire, 2006 https://www50.statcan.ca/census2006/end_e.htm 58Shams Tabriz, “Hamvatanan-e Eziz” 59Mahammed Amin Resulzade, Azerbaijan Problemi, (Ankara: Azerbaycan Kultur DernekiYayinlari, 1920/1996). 60Salman Rushdi, Imaginary Homelands (London, Granta/Penguin, 1991). 61Homi Bhabha, Nation and Narration, (London: Routledge, 1990); Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture, (London: Routledge, 1994). 62Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present (Harvard University Press, 1999) 63Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 336 64Pico Iyer, The Global Soul: Jet Lag, Shopping Malls, and the Search for Home (New York: Knopf, 2000).
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